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the accumulated salary deductions representing the deceased 
employee's contributions, plus interest, as without the exemp-
tion. (In re Nr;wton's Estate, 177 Misc. 877 [32 N.Y.S.2d 
473]; In re Burtman's Estate, 180 Misc. 299 [41 N.Y.S.2d 
778].) This distinction manifestly has no bearing under the 
precise limitation of our statute in exempting "proceeds" of 
an "insurance policy." If it is deemed desirable to exempt 
from inheritance tax such payments as were made here under 
city and state retirement plans, the Legislature should so 
provide in unmistakably clear language. 
The order is reYersed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19242. In Bank. Oct. 21, 1955.J 
EMMETT R. BURNS, Petitioner, v. THE S'l'ATE BAR 
OF CALil!-,ORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys- Disciplinary Proceedings- Review- Burden of 
Proof.-In a proceeding to review the Board of Governors' 
decision in disciplinary proceedings against an attorney, the 
burden is on petitioner to show wherein the decision is 
erroneous or unlawfuL (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083.) 
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence.-Findings of the 
Board of Governors in a disciplinary proceeding that the 
accused attorney commingled trust funds both with personal 
funds and with trust funds of other clients and that he wilfully 
appropriated his client's funds to his own usc are sustained 
by evidence showing, among other things, that he did not 
notify his client that a settlement had been made with respect 
to a personal injury action, that he delayed unreasonably 
turning over the settlement moneys to his client, and that 
he allowed his wife to make use of the funds for their personal 
purposes. 
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-Such contentions as 
that the accused attorney is engaged solely in the trial of 
personal injury litigation, that sueh practitioners are looked 
at "askance," and that the "prosecutor'' was "of a large firm 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 127 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 175; [2] Attorneys, 
§ 172(9); [3-6] Attorneys, § 174. 
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re:[Jn;:;eucul~ the 'interests,' " anrl tlwt the Board of Governors 
has no personal injury attorney as its member but all of them 
represent clientele ''opposing" such practitioners present no 
ground for setting aside a recommendation of the board for 
disciplinary action, where they are based on matters outside 
the record. 
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-A disqualification of 
members of the Board of Governors would not invalidate a 
disciplinary proceeding before the local committee. 
[5] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-Although in a disci-
plinary proceeding against an attorney the findings and rec-
ommendation of the local committee and the Board of Gov-
ernors are aceorded great weight, they are not binding on 
the Supreme Court which, on reviewing the recommendation 
for suspension or disbarment, may pass on sufficiency of the 
evidence, and which will disregard the recommendation when 
it is disproportionate to the misconduct. 
[6] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Punishment.-On review of a 
recommendation by the Board of Governors that an attorney 
be suspended from the practice of law for six months, it was 
ordered that he be suspended for two years where his conduct, 
and his evasive testimony before the board and the local com-
mittee, were not consistent with the high degree of fidelity 
owed to his professional duties. 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension 
of an attorney for six months. Petitioner suspended for 
two years. 
Emmett R. Burns, in pro. per., and Eugene H. 0 'Donnell 
for Petitioner. 
William E. Mussman and Garrett H. Elmore for Re-
spondent. 
THE COURT.-In response to a writ of review, the Board 
of Governors of The State Bar has presented the record 
of the proceeding which is the basis of its recommendation 
that Emmett H. Burns be disciplined by suspension from 
the practice of law for six months. 
'l'he charges of professional misconduct grow out of Burns' 
representation of John H. Crumley in a personal injury 
action. Crumley engaged as his attorney one Sibbett, who 
negotiated a settlement. Crumley rejected it and employed 
Burns, who agreed with Sibbett to divide equally with him 
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thr amount of the contingent fee after deduction of certain 
costs. 
A settlement was reached and Crumley executed a release. 
Burns then received two checks in the aggregate amount of 
$16.400, made payable to ".John Crumley and Emmett R. 
Burns. his attornry." Pursuant to contractual authority, 
Burns indorsed the checks with both names. On the following 
day, the checks were deposited in a bank account to the 
credit of "Alyce Burns or Emmett R. Bnrns Trustee Ac-
count.'' 
'fhe record includes evidence tending to prove these facts: 
Crumley was not notified by Burns of the settlement. He 
found out about it from another source about a month after 
the checks had been delivered. During that time he had tried 
unsuccessfully to find Burns at his officP. He tht>n went to 
The State Bar and the district attorney and, on the advice 
of the latter. sent a registered lett<>r of inquiry to Burns. 
In it, he stated that he had eonsulted the district attorney, 
that he had been ad vised that he should have been paid 
within a few days after he signed tht> release and, if payment 
were not made "within the n<'ar future," he would take 
legal action. 
A few days later Burns talked with Crumley by telephone 
and said that the delay in payment was occasioned by the 
press of litigation in another city. Burns also told Crumley 
that he should not hav<> gone to the district attorney. 
By agreement Burns and Crumley later met and discussed 
the amount of the fee to be paid. Crumley then said that, 
aceording to his understanding of the agreenwnts which had 
bt'en mad<>. Sibbett was entitled to one-fourth of tbr amount 
originally offered in settlement. Burns to reeeive one-third 
of the difference between that amount and the one ultimately 
areepted. Aceording to Burns. Crumley insisted he was 
oblig·ated to pay only ont>-third of the difference between 
these two amounts. 
Burns rejected this proposal, stating that such an arrange-
ment would be contrary to their written contract and also 
to the one he had made with Sibbett. Because he had recently 
moved his office, he told Crumley, his records were disarranged 
and he was unable to product> copit>s of the agreements. 
How<>ver, in Crumley's pr<>sence. he telephoned to Sibbett 
who read to them from his copy of his contract with Burns. 
Burns and Crmnl<'~' agreed to me<>t a week later at Sib-
bett 's office but Burns did not appear. A day or two after-
Oct.1955] BuRKS v. S'rATE BAR 
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ward, Crumley received a telephone call from Burns who 
set a date for a later meeting. At that meeting he accepted 
a pos1dated check of Burns for $12,000. However, before 
the date of this check, Burns called him by telephone and 
,;aid that the check had been made out improperly. He 
asked Crumley to meet him a few days later to receive a 
different one. In the meantime. said Burns, he would try 
to get Sibbett to reduce his fee. 
At their next meeting. Crumley accepted a postdated check 
for $12,500, in exchange for the one he then held. Burns 
told him that he would be notified when the money was in 
the bank Before the date of this eheck. Crumley received 
another telepl10ne call from Burns, who told him that there 
was some question about the validity of thP check becausp it 
had been written on a Sunday and he should exchange it 
for another one. Crumley consulted thP bank in which he 
had his account and was 11dvised that the check would be 
honored if sufficient funds were on deposit. He placed it 
with the bank for collection and it was paid. This was exactly 
three months after Burns received thr money. 
Other testimony in more detail may be summarized as 
follows: 
According to Burns. at their first meeting after the settle-
ment was made, he offered to give Crumley his check for 
$16,400, less costs, but Crumley refused to areept it. Crumley 
denied that any snrh offer had been made to him. The record 
shows that on the day Burns claims to have made the offer, 
he had only $:39.86 to his credit in the bank. 
Burns told the loeal committee that he gave Crumley only 
one check, for $12/iOO and it was not postdated. He recalled 
the date, he said. because Crumley had discussed with him 
a purchase of cattle from a livestock shovY which was then 
in progress. HowevPr. in the hearing befon the Board of 
Governors. Bnrns was asked: '' 1£ vou had money available, 
·why did you givr a post-rlnfrd chcdr'?" (Emphasis added.) 
He explained that it was because he had not yrt cleared the 
matter of SihbPtt 's fee. '"l'l;at was the whole thing. And 
until that final point was settled f told him not to cash the 
check, not to put it throng h." Again he was asked: ""\Vhy 
did you on two occasions givr him post-dated checks if you 
had money available?" ( Emplwsis added.) He replied: 
"\Yell. the chrcks wPre givrn h:· lVfrs Burn~ An<l si <mrd by 
her. At the time when the r:hccks were given to him the 
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dispute with Sibbett had not been settled." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In his testimony, Sibbett described the substitution of 
attorneys and his fcc> arrangmnent with Burns and stated 
that he first learned of the settlement about one week after 
payment was made. He wrote to Burns about his share of' 
the fee and inquired of him by thereafter two or 
three times at intervals of ''a month or two.'' W1JPn Bnrns 
asked if he would consent to a reduction in fee, he said that 
he would not be unreasonable. Later he and Burns each 
agreed to reduce the amount of the fep providPd by thPir 
contract. Sibbett was paid by Burns in cash five months 
after the settlement was made. 
Bank statements disclose that immediately prior to the 
deposit by Burns of the check for $16,400. the balance of 
the ''Alyce Burns or Emmett R. Burns 'l'rnstee Acconut '' 
was $1,4 75.35. Within the next two and one-half months, 
some 30 checks drawn on the account were paid. On thr 
day of the deposit. the bank paid checks totalling $'1,350. 
Within a week, withdrawals in rxeess of deposits had reduced 
the balance to $5,504.20, and about two months later it had 
fallen to $3.3n. Shortly thereafter Burns made two deposits. 
one of $3.500 and another of $13,134. Burns told the Board 
of Governors that the latter one was in thr form of a check. 
but he did not know whether it was "a fee or repayment 
of a loan or something like that.'' 
Burns testified that the settlement checks were deposited 
by his wife, who acted as his bookkeeper and handled all of 
his financial transactions; she ''knew where to deposit them.'' 
According to him. be had explained to his wife that the 
purpose' of the trustee account was to receive settlement 
moneys, which he considered to be trust funds. He said 
that although he did not recall giving her specific instructions 
that the balance of the aceount should never fall below the 
aggregate of trust obligations, he directC'd her to use for their 
pC'rsonal nPrds only money to which they were entitled. 
However. Burns admitted that funds on deposit in his one 
bank account were never segregated as to personal moneys 
and trust funds or to his obligations to individual clients. 
Money from all sources was deposited in the account, and 
i'r'om it were withdrawn expenses of trial preparation, ad-
vances to clients and dislmrsenwnts for personal expenses. 
No record was maintained which showed either aggregate 
or individnal trnst obligations. 
Burns claims to have kept at either his office or his home 
301 
cash reserve fund of five or six tlwusand dollars, "in various 
denominations." from which to advance costs of litigation 
and "to be available for anything that might come up, any 
reason f would have to pay for anything." At 
one time, he said. it had been in his office safe. but for 
the five or six years hearings it 
was left at his home in a location deseribed variously as "in 
the cash box in the filing eabinet-loeked filing eabinet," "the 
file, into a drawer." and "in a room by itself. It's a room 
with a locked door. It's in the bathroom. I have a cabinet. 
It's a steel eabinet in a steel box, and it's behind a locked 
uoor. ,, 
The local committee found that Burns was guilty of "viola-
tions of Sections 610~~- 6067, 6068 and 6106 of the Business 
and Professions Code" and rnle !I of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in that he appropriated for his own use funds be-
longing to Crumley and commingled those funds with his 
own. By a vote of 10 to 5, the Board of Governors ap-
proved and adopted the findings of the local eommittee and 
made the additional finding that the appropriation and eom-
mingling were done wilfully, and that Burns wilfully failed 
to report to Crumley his collection of the settlement moneys. 
Thr board unanimously adopted the recommendation that 
Burm be suspended from the practiee of law for six months. 
[1] fn a procePding to review the board's decision, "the 
burden is upon the petitioner to show wherein the decision 
is erroneous or unlawful.'' (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083; 
Allww v. State Bar. 38 Ca1.2d 257, 258 [239 P.2d 871].) 
Except for insinuations as to the integrity of the complaining 
witness and of bias on the part of the members of the Board 
of Governors, the brief presented by Burns in support of 
his petition consists mamly of a general assertion that the 
findings are unsupported. He contends that they ignore "the 
real issue'' and disregard ''approximately ninety per cent 
( 90%) of the testimony" ; but he does not state "the real 
issue,'' and the testimony recited by him, which amounts 
to only a small part of that presented, is entirely consistent 
with the findings. 
[2] The evidence, including Burns' own admissions, fully 
sunports the conclusion that, contrary to rule 9 of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, 1 he commingled trust funds with 
"'A member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or 
other property of a client with his own; and he shall promptly report 
to the cHent the receipt by him of all money and other property belong· 
ing to such eli en t. " 
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Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 51 
[17 P.2d 112].) The record also fully supports the finding 
that Burns wilfully appropriated his client's funds to his own 
nse. One basis for such a finding is the evidence that he dda:ved 
unreasonably turning- over the settlement moneys to Crumley. 
(Cf. Price v. State Bar. 8 Cal.2d 201 [64 P.2d 727].) The 
board might also haYe based its determination upon the con-
duct of Burns in allowing his wife to make usc of the funds for 
their personal purposes. The evidence in that regard reason-
ably shows that Burns took undue advantage of his client. 
(Of. Roark v. State Bar, 5 Cal.2d 665, 667 [55 P.2d 839]; 
Laney v. State Bar, 7 Cal.2d 419, 422 [GO P.2d 845]; Stanford 
v. State Bar, 15 Cal.2d 721, 728 [104 P.2d 635].) 
As excusing the delay, Burns contends tl1at during the 
three-month period in which payment of the settlement money 
was withheld, he was engaged extensively in the preparation 
and trial of cases and that "the whole delay was over the 
fee.'' But according- to his own testimony, he had no dispute 
with Sibbett. The only controversy was with Crumley and 
it arose in a conference between them more than six weeks 
after the settlemE•nt checks had been received and deposited 
by Burns in his account. In the meantime, Burns had used 
his client's money for his own purposes, and the local com-
mittee was fully justified in disregarding the weak, evasive 
and even conflicting testimony he gave in regard to large 
amounts of cash assertedly kept at his home or office. It is 
significant, in this connection, that the deposits made by 
Burns to meet his postdated cheek to Crumley were by check 
and not cash. Furthermore, it reasonably may be inferred 
from his giving of postdated checks that Burns used this 
means to gain the delay necessary for him to raise the money 
which he had misappropriated. 
In an effort apparently directed toward showing bias and 
prejudice against him on the part of the members of the 
Board of Governors, Burns makes these arguments : He is 
engaged solely in the trial of personal injury litigation; such 
prae:titioncrs, ''due to the insurance advertising,'' are looked 
at "aRkance": the "prosecutor" was "of a large firm repre-
senting the 'interests' "; the board bas, he believes, no per-
sonal injury attorney as its member. but all of ihem renrcsent 
clientele ''opposing'' such practitioners. In conelus.ion, he 
argues that "the Court should know: 1. \vas Mr. Crumley 
during these negotiations being advi;:ed by anyone in the 
State Dar? 2. When did he go to the State Bar?'' 
Oct. 1955] BURNS v. STATE BAR 
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[3] 'l'hese contentions present no ground for setting aside 
the recommendation of discipliuary action; all are based on 
matters outside the record. [4] F'urthermore, neither before 
the local committee nor before the Board of Governors did 
Burns raise the question of bias ( cf. rule 15, Hules of Pro-
cedure of the State Bar) and if the issue had been raised, 
it is doubtful whether d isqnalification would justify setting 
aside the disciplinary proeeeding. ( Cf. Fish v. State Bar, 
214 Cal. 215, 225 [ 4 P.2d 937] .) In any event, a disqualifi-
cation of the board members would not invalidate the pro-
ceeding before the local committee. (Geibel v. 8fryfe Bar, 
14 Cal.2d 144, 147 [93 P.2d 97] .) 
As diseipline, thr local eommittee and the board recom-
mended suspension from the practice of law for six months. 
[5] Although in a disciplinary proceeding the findings of 
fact and recommendation of these bodies are accorded great 
weight, they ''are not binding upon this court, which upon 
reviewing the recommendation for suspension or disbarment 
may, and always does, pass upon the sufficiency of the evi-
dence." (Fall v. State Bar, 25 Cal.2d 149, 159 [153 P.2d 1]; 
Clark v. State Bar, 89 Cal.2d 161 at 165 [2,16 P.2d 1].) This 
eourt will disregard tlw rrcommendation when it is dispro-
portionate to the misconduct. (F'lerning v. Stale Bar, 38 
Cal.2d 841, 342 [2:39 P.2d 866]. 1 
[6] Burns' conduct, his evasive testimony and lack of 
candor before the board and the local committee are not con-
sistent with the high degree of fidelity to his professional 
duties owed by an attorney at law. In his behalf, it may 
be said that he has been practicing since 1930; no prior 
charges stand against him. His client suffered no nltimate 
financial loss and the delay in making payment was only for 
three months. Prom a consideration of all of these cireum-
stances we conclude that suspension from practice for a period 
of two years will meet the ends of justiee. 
The findings of the local committee and the board are fully 
supported and are approved. It is ordered that Emmett R. 
Burns be suspended from the praetice of law in this state 
for a period of two years commencing 30 days after the filing 
of this opinion. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
While I agree with the majority that the evidence is 
sufficient to support the findings of the local administrative 
committee and the Board of Governors that petitioner was 
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guilty of unprofessional conduct in his dcaling8 with his 
client Crumley I am disposed to agree with the discipline 
recommended by both the administrative com mittce and the 
Board of Governors of six mouths' suspension rather than 
the two years' suspension fixed by the majority of this court. 
This court has in numerous cases held that the local admin-
istrative committee is in a better position than either the 
Board of Governors or this court to evaluate the evicknee 
and arrive at a condusion as to what if any discipline should 
be imposed upon a member of the bar who is guilty of unpro-
fessional conduct (Browne v. State Bar, ante, p. 165 [287 
P.2d 745] (September 28, 1955) ), and it seems appro-
priate to me that when the Board of Governors has approved 
the discipline recommended by the local administrative com-
mittee, this court should accept such recommendation in cases 
where the record is sufficient to justify discipline. I would 
therefore suspend petitioner from the praetice of law for a 
period of six months. 
Petitioner's application for a hearing by the Supreme Court 
was denied November 16, 1955, and the time for commenee-
ment of the period of suspension was extended to begin 
January 19, 1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the 
application should be granted. 
(S. F. No. 19337. In Bank. Oct. 21. 19515.J 
CARL HEHSCHBL BONHAM, Appellant, v. 11'. BIUTTON 
McCONNELL, as Insuranee Commissioner, etc., Re-
spondent. 
[lJ Insurance- Agents and Brokers- Licenses- Revocation.-
Under Ins. Code, § 1731, the Insurance Commissioner is vested 
with discretion to revoke or suspend licenses and, while any 
action taken by him may be judicially reviewed to determine 
whether the charges on which it is based are supported by evi-
dence, his decision regarding the appropriate penalty should 
not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. 
[2] !d.-Agents and Brokers-Licenses-Revocation.-With re-
spect to revocation or suspension of licenses of an insurance 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Insurance, § 32.1. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Insurance, § 23, 
